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Abstract
Ithasbeenshownthathighercapitaltaxescanhaveagrowth-enhancingeffect
when combined with a revenue-compensating cut in wage taxes (Uhlig and
Yanagawa 1996; European Economic Review 40, 1521–1540) or with an ex-
pansioninproductivity-increasingpublicservices(Rivas2003;EuropeanEco-
nomicReview47,477–503).Thepresentpaperdemonstratesthattheseresults
critically hinge on the existence of a bequest motive. It is shown that a
wage-tax cut is no longer growth-enhancing when bequests are operative. By
way of contrast,increasing productive public services may well boost growth.
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1.1 Overview
Over the last decades there has been a long-lasting debate in the empirical
and theoretical economic literature on whether, and if so how, ﬁscal pol-
icy aﬀects economic growth. Numerous papers have analyzed the eﬀects of
taxation, transfers, spending, and other actions related to ﬁscal policy on
economic performance. There are at least two things that can be concluded
from these studies: First, ﬁscal policy does aﬀect economic growth. Second,
the extent and the direction of the concrete policy at hand generally depend
on the speciﬁcation of the model. Concerning taxation of income, especially
from capital, it is, however, commonly believed that there is an adverse eﬀect
on growth. Models analyzing the equilibrium relationship between capital in-
come taxes and growth typically ﬁnd that an increase of the capital income
tax reduces the return to private investment, which in turn implies a de-
crease of capital accumulation and thus growth (Lucas, 1990; Rebelo, 1991).
Besides these positive studies, there also exists a huge body of literature deal-
ing with normative eﬀects of capital income taxation, originally triggered by
Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), who ﬁnd that capital taxation decreases
welfare and a zero capital tax is thus eﬃcient in the long-run steady state.
In some theoretical work, however, provocative evidence is put forward
that capital income taxation may increase growth (Uhlig and Yanagawa,
1996; Rivas, 2003). Time series of capital income tax rates and personal
savings in the US, for instance, seem to be positively correlated in the long
run, suggesting that the conventional wisdom of low capital taxes fostering
growth is less clear cut than had been proposed by most preceding theoretical
studies.
Yet, an important deﬁciency of these studies is the absence of intergen-
erational transfers in form of bequests. The importance of such transfers for
capital accumulation has been documented by several papers; see for instance
Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981, 1986) and, more recently, DeLong (2003, Fig.
2-1).
These studies conﬁrm a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of bequests on capital ac-
cumulation and growth. What they cannot reveal, however, is the actual
individual motive for leaving bequests.1 Most of the existing literature mod-
els that motive by assuming that individuals take into account the inﬁnite
stream of descendants’ utilities as in Barro (1974). Within such a setting,
various authors have shown that capital income taxation typically translates
1For a comprehensive survey of diﬀerent altruistic bequest motives see Michel et al.
(2006).
4into lower growth2. The main criticism of Barro’s approach is that a whole
dynasty behaves as one decision unit having perfect foresight about the in-
deﬁnite future.
Alternatively, individuals may be assumed to have a joy-of-giving bequest
motive (Andreoni, 1989). In this case, the time horizon is ﬁnite, but the
magnitude of transfers is independent of the descendant’s well-being, and
thus capital taxation may have a positive eﬀect on growth under similar
conditions as in Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996). In this paper, however, I adopt
the family altruism model, which allows us to work with a ﬁnite planning
horizon and, at the same time, leaves the bequest motive sensitive to the
oﬀspring’s economic situation (Lambrecht et al., 2005, 2006; Bréchet and
Lambrecht, 2009). Within such a setting, parents are concerned about the
disposable income of their immediate descendants and not about the use of
this income.3 Consequently, the disposable income of the children (not their
utility) becomes an argument of the individual’s utility function. Empirical
evidence for the family altruism model is provided by Laitner and Justner
(1996), who ﬁnd that the amount of households’ bequests is largest for those
with the lowest assessment of children’s possible earnings.4 Altogether, such
a speciﬁcation is clearly more general than the joy-of-giving approach and
seems to be more realistic than Barro’s model.
In the next section, I incorporate the family altruism motive into an
endogenous growth model in order to study two important ﬁscal policies.
Firstly, I reexamine the eﬀect of capital income taxation on long-run growth
if intergenerational transfers within the family are operative. Secondly, I
study how the composition of government spending aﬀects the growth rate.
The model describes a uniﬁed framework comprising the results found by
Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) and Rivas (2003) as special cases whenever in-
tergenerational transfers are inoperative and the government uses additional
2This kind of model is formally equivalent to one assuming a representative and inﬁnite-
lived agent; see, again, Lucas (1990) and Rebelo (1991).
3This formulation originally goes back to Becker and Tomes (1979), who assume that
parents care about the quality or the economic success of their children as measured by
the children’s lifetime income. Such an approach has also been used in growth models
with human capital; see, e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), in which preferences depend
on the quality of schools, which in turn are directly related to the disposable income of
the children. See also Grüner (1995).
4See also Mankiw (2000), who argues that neither the Barro model nor the pure life-
cycle model is suited to analyze ﬁscal policy. This is due to three important observations:
First, in reality consumption smoothing over time is not as perfect as both models predict.
Second, there are a lot of households near zero wealth for which saving is not a normal
activity. Third, the life-cycle model cannot account for the importance of bequests in
capital accumulation.
5tax revenue from capital taxation to either reduce the tax burden on labour
income or enhance productive government spending.
Endogenous growth in this model is generated by a positive externality of
a fraction of total government spending that aﬀects private investment and
bequest decisions. This type of spending is referred to as public services (or
productive spending, as above) and captures expenditures on the stock of a
country’s infrastructure, including, e.g, highways, hospitals, and communi-
cation systems.5 The government decides about the fraction of total outlays
allocated to either productive spending or usual government consumption
that do not aﬀect productivity. Furthermore, public services are assumed
to be provided without user fees, and, for reasons of simplicity, the issue of
congestion is ruled out.
It turns out that the results critically depend on how the government uses
the additional tax revenue resulting from an increase of the capital income
tax. Growth unambiguously declines in the presence of intergenerational
transfers if expenditures are ﬁxed and revenue from capital income taxation
is used to cut labour taxes, but may increase if public services are enhanced
instead. Finally, the impact of changing the composition of total spending
in favour of government consumption on growth is clearly negative. These
results are generally driven by three channels: First, they depend on how
savings react to changes in long-run interest rates. Second, they depend
on the mechanism of income redistribution, which is either a shift of the
tax burden across generations or a shift in factor productivity. Third, the
possibility of redistributing income within the family as a reaction to a change
in the tax structure matters. Numerical results reveal realistic parameter
constellations in which growth increases if income is redistributed through
an increase in total factor productivity.
The idea that public spending may have a positive eﬀect on growth has
received much attention in both the empirical and the theoretical litera-
ture. Following the pioneering work of Aschauer (1989), many empirical
studies conﬁrm the result that public investment positively aﬀects the re-
turn to private capital and thus private investment (e.g., Easterly and Re-
belo 1993; Gramlich 1994; Morrison and Schwartz 1996)6. On theoretical
grounds, much of the literature follows the seminal work of Barro (1990),
who establishes productive government services to be one important source
5For a recent review of the role of public spending in endogenous growth theory see
Minea (2008).
6Note, however, that some studies either face diﬃculties in isolating a positive eﬀect in
cross section data or even report a negative relation of government spending and growth in
that high spending may decrease income, e.g. Agell et al. (1997) and Evans and Karragas
(1994).
6of sustained endogenous growth. In these models, the relation of income
taxation and growth is usually nonlinear, depending on the initial level of
taxation. Yet, in those papers the analysis is conducted within a represen-
tative, inﬁnite-lived agent model and is thus not able to capture the impact
of taxation on life-cycle savings and intergenerational transfers within the
family.
1.2 Related Literature
From a technical point of view, there are a lot of studies that examine the
relation of capital taxation and growth in the presence of bequests and then
distinguish the two cases of operative transfers and bequest constraints (see,
e.g., Ihori 1997; Caballé 1998). In general, these studies ﬁnd negative (or no)
growth eﬀect if bequests are operative, depending on how the additional rev-
enue from increased taxation is used. However, the modeling of the bequest
motive in this paper is in contrast to most of this literature. So far, there
have only been a few papers dealing with intergenerational transfers within
the family: Lambrecht et al. (2005) analyze the eﬀect of public pensions on
growth when altruistic parents can aﬀect their children’s income through in-
vestment in education and by leaving bequests. It turns out that an increase
in the pension level is bad for growth, in that it distorts the decision between
bequest and education in the case of inoperative bequests. Lambrecht et al.
(2006) study diﬀerent ﬁscal policies within a neoclassical framework. They
ﬁnd that a pay-as-you-go pension scheme has no eﬀect on the intertemporal
equilibrium, whereas public debt is not neutral, because private intergenera-
tional transfers cannot neutralize public intergenerational transfers induced
by public debt. Finally, Bréchet and Lambrecht (2009) examine the interplay
between population growth and the use of natural resources, which can ei-
ther be used in production or bequeathed to the children. They ﬁnd that the
strength of the bequest motive is crucial in determining the role of resource
preservation as a reaction to demographic shocks.
The most closely related studies are Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) and Rivas
(2003); also, Aschauer (1989) and Morrison and Schwartz (1996) provide
empirical evidence for some of the results concerning the role of productive
government spending. Moreover, the speciﬁcation of the family altruism
model can be justiﬁed by the empirical ﬁndings of Laitner and Justner (1996)
and Mankiw (2000).
Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) set up an overlapping-generations model in
which endogenous growth is generated by a positive externality—viz., tech-
nological spillovers in production, across ﬁrms. Moreover, government ex-
penditures are assumed to be a ﬁxed fraction of output, being ﬁnanced by
7proportional taxes on wage and capital income. As labour income accrues
mostly to the young generation and capital income to the old generation,
a shift of the tax burden from wage to capital taxation may then increase
growth if the interest elasticity of savings is suﬃciently small.
Rivas (2003), by contrast, presents an overlapping-generations model in
which sustained growth is ensured by public investment in a country’s in-
frastructure, i.e., productive government spending. In fact, this is a diﬀerent
source of externality in production that is capable of generating endogenous
growth. This model explicitly takes into account the composition of total
government outlays: Tax revenue can be allocated either to government con-
sumption, to public services, or to transfers.7 Rivas shows that within such a
setting increased capital taxation may enhance growth if, again, the interest
elasticity of savings fulﬁls some restrictions. Yet, the result does not require
a shift of the tax burden, but stems from the eﬀect of taxation on factor pro-
ductivity, which constitutes an alternative channel for redistributing income
among generations.
Consequently, these studies indicate that the actual mechanism of direct
or indirect income redistribution across generations matters in determining
the outcome of capital taxation on growth. By allowing for intergenerational
transfers within the family, this paper adds an alternative private redistri-
bution channel to the analysis and then reexamines the eﬀect of capital tax-
ation on growth. Interestingly, it turns out that the latter channel oﬀsets
the income redistribution induced by the shift of the tax burden but cannot
(totally) compensate intergenerational redistribution induced by changes in
total factor productivity. By contrast, in the latter scenario, positive growth
eﬀects are obtained under weaker assumptions than in the case when inter-
generational transfers are absent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
basic model. The intertemporal equilibrium for this economy is deﬁned, and
it is shown that such an equilibrium is characterized either by operative or by
inoperative bequests. For both cases the growth eﬀects of capital taxation are
determined. Further, the impact of an increase in government consumption
on growth is analyzed. In the last subsection, the model is calibrated using
US data, and the numerical results are presented. Section 3 concludes.
7Note, however, that if government expenditures are ﬁxed, a shift of the tax burden
from the young to the old as in Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) is then capable of generating
their positive-growth result. In this case the two models are formally equivalent and the
only diﬀerence is the source of sustained growth.
82 The model
The basic framework is an overlapping-generation model in the tradition of
Diamond (1965), in which parents have an altruistic concern for their chil-
dren. In contrast to most of the existing literature, this concern is modeled
by providing children with a disposable income later on in life, i.e., the dis-
posable income of the child becomes an argument of the individual utility
function (Lambrecht et al., 2006). Moreover, markets are competitive, and
the size of population is assumed to be constant. The government collects
taxes and allocates the revenue to either productive government spending or
nonproductive government consumption. This setup is capable of generating
an endogenous growth process in line with Barro (1990).
2.1 Firms
On the production side of the model, perfect competition between a large
number of identical ﬁrms is assumed. A representative ﬁrm in period t pro-
duces a homogenous output good according to a Cobb–Douglas production







where 1 >α>0 is the share parameter of capital, A>0 is a general index
of eﬃciency, and Gs
t denotes the ﬂow of aggregate government services.
Each ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts under perfect competition, implying that, in
equilibrium, production factors are paid their marginal products:















Clearly, an increase of the amount of government services Gs
t exerts a posi-
tive externality on each ﬁrm’s output, since producers take Gs
t as given when
maximizing proﬁts. This in turn enhances the productivity of labour and
capital. The speciﬁc form of the technology exhibits increasing returns to
scale in labour, capital, and government expenditures taken together. How-
ever, as will be shown below, there are constant returns at the aggregate level,
which enables one to analyze the long-run growth eﬀects of policy changes
without transitional dynamics.
Due to the speciﬁcation of the production technology, the model features
scale eﬀects. Yet, as population size is assumed to be constant, these eﬀects,
and also those of congestion (see, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Glomm
9and Ravikumar 1998), are excluded from the analysis. More speciﬁcally, the
assumption that the aggregate ﬂow of government services (instead of the per
capita ﬂow) enters the production technology implies that public services are
nonrival and nonexcludable.
2.2 Government
The government balances its budget in each period t. Revenue is generated
by proportional taxes on wage income, 0 ≤ tw ≤ 1, and interest income,
0 ≤ tr < 1,8 in order to ﬁnance the amount of total government spending
Gt in period t. Total spending can be decomposed into a fraction 0 ≤ φ<1
of government consumption, denoted Gc
t, and a fraction 1 − φ of productive




t +( 1− φ)G
s
t. (4)
Such a speciﬁcation allows one to study the eﬀect of a change in the com-
position of total government expenditures on long-run growth. It is further
assumed that total expenditures are a ﬁxed share of national output, i.e.,




rrtKt = κYt. (5)
2.3 Consumers
At each period in time, there exist a number of young and a number of old
individuals. The population is assumed to be stationary. When young, each
individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour and receives the net wage
(1 − tw)wt. She also receives a nonnegative bequest, bt. Income is spent on
consumption ct and savings st:
It ≡ (1 − t
w)wt + bt = ct + st. (6)
When old, each individual allocates the return to savings (Rt+1st) to second-
period consumption (dt+1) and to a nonnegative bequest to the oﬀspring
(bt+1). The second period’s budget constraint is thus
dt+1 = Rt+1st − bt+1, (7)
8In order to generate sustained long-run growth, the interest rate must be positive.
This restricts the capital income tax rate to be smaller than one.
10where Rt+1 = 1+(1−tr)rt+1 is the gross interest rate after capital tax between
dates t and t+1. The economy is called bequest-constrained if bt+1 =0 ,a n d
bequests are operative if bt+1 > 0.
Individual preferences are of the CES type and depend on ﬁrst- and
second-period consumption and on the disposable income of the children:
It+1 =( 1− t
w)wt+1 + bt+1. (8)

















This speciﬁcation allows one to explicitly study the eﬀects of a varying degree
of altruism captured by the parameter λ ≥ 0. Here ρ>0 is a discount factor,
and σ>0 the intertemporal substitution elasticity.
Each individual maximizes the utility (9), subject to the constraints (6),
(7), (8) and to the nonnegativity of bequests (bt+1 ≥ 0), by choosing ct, st,









It+1 (= if bt+1 > 0). (11)
The ﬁrst equation is the standard condition over the life cycle, determining
optimal savings. The second one gives the optimal amount of bequests.
Bequests are positive if the marginal utility from old-age consumption equals
the marginal utility from leaving the bequest.
Solving equation (10) subject to the budget constraints (6) and (7), the
optimal savings function is found:




where ψ(Rt+1)=( Rt+1ρ)σ/[Rt+1 +( Rt+1ρ)σ] is the saving rule. From equa-







Individual savings depend positively on the disposable income and the amount
of bequest transferred to the descendant. In turn, optimal bequests are pos-
itively related to individual savings, but decrease with increase of next pe-
riod’s net wage.9
9Note that equations (12) and (13) can easily be solved explicitly for st and bt+1,w h i c h
112.4 Intertemporal Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, ﬁrms’ proﬁts will be zero, and proﬁt maximiza-
tion implies that each ﬁrm equates, for a given amount of productive govern-
ment spending Gs
t, the rental and the wage rate to the marginal products of
capital and labour, respectively (equations (3) and (2)). Consequently, each
ﬁrm chooses the same capital–labour ratio. With these facts, it is easy to
obtain the share of national output spent by the government, i.e., κ,a sa
weighted average of the tax rates: Insert the equilibrium factor prices into
the government’s budget constraint, equation (5), and rearrange terms to
reach
κ =( 1− α)t
w + αt
r. (14)
The aggregate production technology is then given by the standard AK
type with constant returns to capital:
Yt = ˜ AKt, (15)
where ˜ A =[ A((1−φ)κLt)1−α]1/α. Aggregate input prices can thus be rewrit-
ten as




rt = α ˜ A. (17)
Output and wage rate are proportional to capital and will grow at the same
rate as aggregate capital on a balanced growth path. The interest rate and
thus also the interest factor Rt+1 are constant and time-invariant10.F o r a
given composition of government expenditures, both marginal productivities
increase with the government-spending–output ratio κ, which in turn de-
pends positively on both tax rates. For ﬁxed tax rates instead, input prices
also increase if the government changes the composition of expenditures in
favour of productive spending (a decrease in the parameter φ).
We are now able to deﬁne the intertemporal equilibrium of the economy.
Given a ﬁscal policy (parameters tw, tr,a n dφ) and an initial value of the cap-
ital stock k0 = K0/N−1 = s−1, a perfect-foresight intertemporal equilibrium
is characterized by a sequence of quantities and prices:
{ct,d t,k t,s t,b t; wt,r t}t≥0.
are then functions of individual income It, the interest factor Rt+1, and next period’s net
wage (1 − tw)wt+1. Yet, for reasons of convenience and in order to clarify the eﬀect
of private intergenerational transfers on savings and growth, I work with the equations
mentioned above. This, of course, does not aﬀect any of the results.
10The time index will therefore be omitted in the following; it is R = Rt+1 for all t.
12Individuals maximize utility, factor markets are competitive, and all markets
clear. The market-clearing conditions for the labour and good markets are
Lt = Nt, (18)
Kt = Nt−1st−1. (19)
For all t, the values of Gs
t and Gc
t are determined by equations (4) and (5).
The condition (18) states that the labour market is characterized by full
employment; the demand for labour determines the market-clearing wage
rate. The condition (19) states that in each period, the stock of capital
results from individuals’ savings in the preceding period. The demand for
capital determines the market-clearing rental rate.
In a next step, it is shown that the intertemporal equilibrium is character-
ized by either operative or inoperative bequests, depending on the parents’
degree of altruism towards their child. Moreover, the growth rates of the
economy in both cases are determined, and the conditions for a balanced
growth path are speciﬁed. The analysis reveals that there exists an ex-
plicit threshold for the altruism parameter λ that indicates which of the two
regimes, operative or inoperative bequests, is at work.
The ﬁrst step is to determine aggregate savings: Summing individual
savings, equation (12), over all Nt young individuals and taking the deﬁnition
of It,e q u a t i o n( 6 ) ,i n t oa c c o u n tg i v e s
St = ψ(R)[(1 − t




Aggregate savings are positively related to aggregate income (the sum of wage
income and the amount of bequest received from parents) and to aggregate
bequests devoted to children. The impact of an increase in the interest
factor is ambiguous, depending on the parameters of the model. In a closed
economy, aggregate savings of the young are used to ﬁnance next period’s
capital stock Kt+1 = St (the capital market clearing condition). Therefore,
the expression (20) can be used to determine the growth factor of capital, gt =
Kt+1/Kt. Moreover, by the deﬁnition of a balanced growth path, bequests
grow at the same rate as capital, i.e., gt = bt+1/bt. Finally, expressing the
wage rate by the marginal productivity of labour, equation (16), yields an
implicit expression for the growth factor of capital,
gt = ψ(R)[(1 − t




where xt = btNt/Kt deﬁnes the bequest–capital ratio in period t. This ratio
equals zero if and only if the economy is bequest-constrained, i.e., bt =0 .
13Solve (21) for gt to get an explicit expression for the growth factor:
gt = ˜ ψ(R,xt)[(1 − t
w)(1 − α) ˜ A + xt]. (22)
with ˜ ψ(R,xt)=( Rρ)σ/[R +( Rρ)σ − xt]. In the case of inoperative bequests,
we have xt =0 . The growth factor is then constant over time, and ˜ ψ(R,0) =
ψ(R). In case of operative bequests, however, growth is additionally aﬀected
by the bequest–capital ratio xt. The analysis proceeds by showing that this
ratio is constant on a balanced growth path, implying that gt (in the case of
operative bequests) in equation (22) is also constant over time and there are
no transitional dynamics.
From the deﬁnition of xt, it follows that bt = xtKt/Nt. Dividing equation
(13), the optimal amount of bequests devoted by parents to their child, by bt
and recalling that the wage rate grows at the same rate as aggregate capital,















Now, expressing the wage rate in terms of the marginal productivity of















Further analysis of equation (23) gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 On a balanced growth path, the bequest–capital ratio is con-
stant and satisﬁes





σR − (1 − t
w)(1 − α) ˜ A

. (24)
Bequests are operative, i.e., x>0, as long as
λ>ˆ λ =





Proof: Setting bt+1/bt = gt in (23) and solving for xt gives (24). In turn,
solving (24) for λ gives the critical value in equation (25).
The threshold level ˆ λ is related negatively to the wage tax and positively
to the capital income tax. Bequests are thus more likely when wage taxes are
high, since individuals then foresee that the descendant’s economic situation
14will worsen as net wages will be lower. The inverse relation applies to the
capital income tax, because a higher tax rate reduces the old’s return to their
savings and consequently also the amount of bequest that parents devote to
their child. Consequently, excessive capital income taxation may crowd out
private intergenerational transfers.
On the basis of these ﬁndings, the following subsections will reexamine
the eﬀect of capital income taxation with (in)operative bequests on growth
for two speciﬁc ﬁscal policies: Firstly, I consider a situation in which the ad-
ditional revenue from an increase of the capital income tax is used to cut the
wage tax and government spending is ﬁxed. This is the ﬁscal policy examined
by Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996), in which the shift of the tax burden generates
a pure positive income eﬀect and thus possible positive growth eﬀects due to
increased savings. Secondly, an increase of the capital income tax is used to
enhance the government-spending–output ratio, thereby boosting output and
the marginal productivity of labour as well as capital. Rivas (2003) shows
that such a setting constitutes a diﬀerent source of positive growth eﬀects.
In the following, without loss of generality, population size and thus also
labour supply will be normalized to one for reasons of simplicity.
2.5 Revenue-neutral tax reform
Throughout this subsection it is assumed that the composition and the level
of government expenditures, i.e., the parameters φ and κ, are ﬁxed. An
increase of the capital income tax rate tr is used to reduce the wage tax
tw, implying that the wage tax is now endogenously determined. Recall
the expression for the government-spending–output ratio, equation (14), and










Under these assumptions, the model is very similar to the one in Uhlig and
Yanagawa (1996) if bequests are inoperative. Yet, the engines of growth are
diﬀerent in the two models: In Uhlig and Yanagawa sustained growth results
from a positive technological spillover, whereas in this model public services
ensure the existence of a balanced growth path. Moreover, the presence of
intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests within the family adds
additional eﬀects to the growth process. The formal analysis proceeds as
follows:
The growth factor in the case of operative bequests, equation (22), de-
pends on the wage tax tw and the bequest–capital ratio x, where x in turn
depends on tw, equation (24). Plugging equation (26) into both expressions
15and rearranging terms yields




g = ˜ ψ(R,x)[θ − R + x] (28)
with θ =1+( 1− κ) ˜ A. Now, ﬁrst look at the case when intergenerational
transfers are absent, i.e., x =0 . The growth factor is then inﬂuenced through
two channels that are captured by the two multiplicative factors determining
the growth factor in equation (28): Firstly, increasing the capital income tax
evokes the well-known opposing substitution and income eﬀects. Therefore,
the overall eﬀect on savings and hence on growth is ambiguous and depends
on the interest elasticity of savings, which in turn depends on the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution11. Secondly, raising the capital tax allows for
reduction of labour income taxes. This increases the net wage of the work-
ing part of the population, thereby leading to more income out of which to
save. Thus, the second eﬀect is equivalent to a pure positive income eﬀect
and fosters the growth process. The overall eﬀect turns out to be positive






where IK/IL is the ratio of after-tax capital income to after-tax labour in-
come. This condition is exactly the same as stated by Uhlig and Yanagawa
(1996) in their second proposition. The pure positive income eﬀect then out-
weighs possible negative substitution eﬀects (occurring in the case of σ>1).
However, if intergenerational transfers are operative, i.e., x>0,t h e
bequest–capital ratio additionally inﬂuences growth via two channels: On
the one hand, the presence of intergenerational transfers aﬀects the saving
rule.12 In contrast to the case of x =0 , savings are higher, since young
individuals not only save for future consumption but also to leave a positive









12Recall that, in contrast to the case of inoperative bequests, this rule is now given by
˜ ψ(R,x)=
(Rρ)σ
R +( Rρ)σ − x
.
16amount of bequest. Yet, an increase of the capital income tax enhances the
disposable income of the immediate descendant, as future net wages will
increase. Anticipating this positive future income eﬀect, the current young
generation reduces its savings in order to transfer a smaller amount of bequest
to its children in period t +1 .
On the other hand, family members respond to the public income redis-
tribution due to the change in the tax structure by redistributing the total
family income (in period t).13 More speciﬁcally, currently old individuals
reduce their amount of bequest by exactly the amount that barely oﬀsets the
negative income eﬀect due to a declining return to savings and the positive
income eﬀect of the young individuals resulting from an increasing net wage.
Analytically, this can be shown by inserting equation (27) into (28). One
then obtains a simple expression for the growth factor with operative bequests











From this equation, it is easy to see that the positive income eﬀect is exactly
canceled out by an appropriate decrease of the bequest–capital ratio, since θ
is independent of the capital income tax rate. Moreover, optimal individual
savings always decline due to an increase of the capital income tax, as argued
above.
To summarize, I have shown the following:
Proposition 2 A revenue-neutral increase of the capital income tax that
decreases the wage tax
1. may increase growth in the case of inoperative bequests if the interest





2. unambiguously decreases growth if bequests are operative.
Proof: In the case of inoperative bequests, we have x =0 . Taking the
derivative of equation (28) with respect to tr gives
∂ψ(R)
∂R
(θ − R) − ψ(R) < 0.
13Note that the tax reform under consideration does not aﬀect total family income in
period t, which is the sum of returns to savings from the old plus the net wage of the
young, i.e., Ωt =( 1− tw)wt + Rst−1. It is straightforward to show that ∂Ωt/∂tr =0 .
17Rewriting this inequality yields the result.
The saving rule in the case of operative bequests is
˜ ψ(R,x)=
(Rρ)σ
R +( Rρ)σ − x
.











˜ ψ(R) < 0.
It follows that an increase of tr always reduces growth.
The analysis reveals that the overall eﬀect is always negative. Conse-
quently, the introduction of intergenerational transfers within the family con-
stitutes an additional objection to the results found by Uhlig and Yanagawa
(1996). In their paper, they already admit that there are no positive growth
eﬀects if the overlapping-generations structure is extended to multiple peri-
ods of life. The same holds if parents are concerned about the disposable
income of their child.
2.6 Increasing public services
Now, consider a situation in which the composition of government expendi-
tures, φ, and the labour tax rate, tw, are ﬁxed. An increase of the capital
income tax rate is used to enhance productive government spending, im-
plying that the government-spending–output ratio κ is now endogenous and
equation (14) holds.
Under these assumptions the model is very similar to the one in Rivas
(2003) in the case of inoperative bequests. However, if bequests are opera-
tive, there is an additional channel that inﬂuences growth as in the preceding
section. In contrast to the model in Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996), where the
government ﬁnances a ﬁxed level of government consumption, the govern-
ment is now provided with an active role in the economy by allocating tax
revenues to diﬀerent categories of spending. Moreover, growth is now pri-
marily driven by changes in productivity rather than by shifts of the tax
burden.
18In order to assess the eﬀect of capital income taxation on long-run growth,
it turns out to be important to determine the eﬀect on the long-run interest
rate. Following Rivas (2003), I ﬁrst analyze the impact of an increase in the
capital income tax on the net-of-tax interest rate, given by i = R − 1,a n d
then determine the eﬀect on growth. Taking the deﬁnitions of the interest
factor R and the productivity index ˜ A into account, the net-of-tax interest
rate amounts to




It is easy to see that i is decreasing in φ and increasing in tw. However,
there exists a nonlinearity with respect to tr, since an increase of the capital
income tax decreases the capital tax factor on the one hand but enhances
the government-spending–output ratio κ (i.e., ∂κ/∂tr = α>0) on the other



















ϕ =( 1− t
r)
−1.
Here ϑ is the rate of change in total factor productivity due to changes in
capital taxation, and ϕ the rate of change in the capital tax factor, which
can be interpreted as the degree of distortion due to capital income taxation.
Depending on the relative strength of the two eﬀects, an increase of the
capital income tax may either increase or decrease the net-of-tax interest
rate, which in turn depends on the existing level of taxation. These results
are summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 3 The net-of-tax interest rate i is a concave function of the
capital income tax tr, reaching a maximum at ¯ tr =( 1− α)(1 − tw). The
direction of the change in the interest rate (for given labour tax and expendi-
ture composition) due to an increase of the capital income tax depends on the
ratio of government revenue from capital taxation to the net-of-tax capital
income of the private sector (equal to i) for a given tax rate. It is given by
∂i


















19is the elasticity of productivity with respect to the capital tax rate, and MK =
trα ˜ A is the government’s per unit of capital revenue from capital income
taxation.





It is then straightforward to check that B(¯ tr)=0 , where 0 < ¯ tr =( 1−α)(1−
tw) < 1. Moreover, rewriting the inequality trB(tr) ≷ 0 yields the equivalence
stated above. In order to establish concavity, note that ϕ(0) = 1 < 1/tw =
ϑ(0) with ϕ (tr) > 0 and ϑ (tr) < 0 for tr ∈ [0,1). Consequently, ϑ and ϕ
intersect only once in the relevant range, namely at ˆ tr.
Note that these results are essentially the same as in Rivas (2003). What
diﬀers, however, is the restrictions imposed on the tax rate parameters. In
this model the only restriction is tr < 1 in order to have a positive net-
of-tax interest rate. Rivas, by contrast, imposes an upper (lower) bound
on the capital (labour) income tax rate to ensure sustained growth. Those
diﬀerences result from the simplifying assumption of no capital depreciation
on the one hand and the fact that lifetime income may be positive even if
labour income is completely taxed away due to intergenerational transfers on
the other hand.
We are now in a position to analyze the overall eﬀect of an increase in
the capital income tax rate on growth in the case of (in)operative bequests.
Recall therefore equation (22), the growth factor. Similarly to the preceding
section, growth is aﬀected through three channels with respect to capital
income taxation: Firstly, an increase in the capital income tax enhances pro-
ductivity and thus wages and income. Secondly, changes in capital taxation
aﬀect the real rate of return, which in turn aﬀects growth. The direction of
this latter eﬀect depends on the interest elasticity of savings. Finally, the
presence of intergenerational transfers distorts the individual saving rule on
the one hand and induces an adjustment of private intergenerational trans-
fers on the other hand. In order to simplify the theoretical analysis, insert
the bequest–capital ratio x, equation (24), into the growth factor, equation









1+λσ[R + ¯ t
r ˜ A].
Depending on the existing level of capital taxation, the model features posi-
tive growth eﬀects even if bequests are operative:
20Proposition 4 Suppose that the the rate of capital income taxation is suﬃ-
ciently low, i.e., tr < ¯ tr, and that the composition of government spending is
ﬁxed. Increasing the capital income tax then enhances growth even if bequests
are operative.
Proof: In the following, the elasticity of a variable k with respect to the
argument j will be denoted ˆ kj.
The elasticity of the growth factor with respect to tr is then








+ˆ gI ˆ Itr.
Calculating and inserting the respective elasticities, this equation can be rewrit-
ten as

















Taking the deﬁnition of κ into account, it is straightforward to show that
the second term in the brackets is positive if and only if the initial capital
income tax rate is not too high, i.e., if tr < ¯ tr/α. In this case, the positive
income eﬀect of higher net wages always oﬀsets the (possibly) negative eﬀect
on individual income due to a reduced amount of bequest. Consequently, for
tr < ¯ tr one has ˆ ˜ Atr >M K/i, and the above expression is clearly positive.
Two remarks are in order. First, note that the inequality stated in the above
proposition is a suﬃcient condition but not necessary. From equation (34) it
is easy to see that positive growth results are still possible even if the existing
capital income tax level exceeds the threshold value ¯ tr. In fact, there exists
a growth-maximizing level of the tax rate as long as ¯ tr <t r <t r/α. Second,
if intergenerational transfers are absent, i.e., x =0 , the model is equivalent
to the one in Rivas (2003). The growth factor, equation (22), can then be
written as
g = ˜ ψ(R,0) ·
1+λσ




r ˜ A, (35)
implying that








+ ˆ ˜ Atr. (36)
A positive growth eﬀect in this case requires not only a suﬃciently small
prevalent capital income tax rate as above, i.e., tr < ¯ tr, but also an interest
elasticity of savings,  (R), that exceeds zero. More speciﬁcally, the sub-
stitution eﬀect must dominate the income eﬀect, which is fulﬁlled if σ ≥ 1.
21Consequently, a positive growth result can be obtained under weaker assump-
tions when individuals have the possibility to redistribute income within the
family.
So what is the intuition behind these results? An increase of the capital
income tax increases the ﬂow of public services if the composition of spend-
ing is unaltered. This in turn enhances total factor productivity, thereby
increasing the real wages and thus the individual income of the young. Con-
sequently, individuals are left with more income out of which to save. This
is the direct eﬀect of capital taxation, which increases aggregate savings and
growth. Furthermore, income is aﬀected by the amount of bequest that in-
dividuals receive from their parents. This amount may either increase or
decrease, depending on the relative strength of the eﬀects from increased
capital taxation on the wage and on the interest rate: If the positive income
eﬀect of the young oﬀsets the (ambiguous) eﬀect stemming from changes in
the rate of return to the old’s savings, the amount of bequest declines as
parents deal with the negative eﬀect of public income redistribution on their
own income by adjusting private intergenerational transfers.14
There are two more indirect eﬀects at work: On the one hand, movements
of the capital tax rate aﬀect the after-tax rate of return to savings and thus
the intertemporal price of consumption. The direction of this eﬀect depends
on the direction of change in the interest rate and on how individuals adapt
their consumption–saving decision to this change. On the other hand, the
presence of intergenerational transfers aﬀects the individual saving decision
even further, since individuals adapt the amount of bequest devoted to their
child, and thus their savings, to changes in the capital income tax rate. If
future net wages increase, the current young individuals save less to give a
smaller amount of bequest to their descendants. Yet, the eﬀect of increased
capital taxation on the individual saving decision is clear: savings decline if
and only if future income increases and the interest rate decreases.
To sum up, the overall eﬀect on growth is generally ambiguous. However,
the analysis does not exclude positive growth eﬀects even if bequests are
operative.
So far, the analysis has shed light on the question how capital income tax-
ation aﬀects growth under two speciﬁc ﬁscal policies when intergenerational
transfers are operative. The following subsection, by contrast, examines the
impact of the outlay of government expenditures on growth.
14Analytically, it is straightforward to show that a suﬃcient condition for bequests to
decline, i.e., ∂(1 − tw)wt/∂tr >∂ R s t−1/∂tr,i sα ≥ 0.5. In this case, the eﬀect of capital
taxation on individual income is ambiguous, depending on the trade-oﬀ between higher
net wages and reduced bequests.
222.7 Changing the expenditure composition
In this subsection it is assumed that the tax rates, tw and tr, and thus also
the total share of government expenditures, κ, are ﬁxed. The focus is now
on changes in the parameter φ—more speciﬁcally, a situation in which the
government decides to reduce the amount of spending on public services in
favour of an increase in government consumption, i.e., an increase in φ.I n
the related model where intergenerational transfers are absent, Rivas (2003)
shows that such a policy unambiguously decreases growth if the interest
elasticity of savings exceeds zero. The intuition behind this result is that
a decline in government services reduces productivity and consequently the
return on savings and real wages. If the interest elasticity is suﬃciently large,
both channels will reduce savings and thus growth. However, the situation is
not that clear if intergenerational transfers are operative. The overall eﬀect
on growth then additionally depends on how private income redistribution
within the family reacts to such a policy reform.
In analogy to the preceding section, the amount of bequest that parents
devote to their child decreases if the negative income eﬀect on the young
caused by declining real wages is larger than the negative income eﬀect on
the old that stems from a decreased rate of return to savings.15 Consequently,
bequests and thus also individual and aggregate income may well increase
through this channel. The overall eﬀect on income is then characterized
by a trade-oﬀ between lower real wages and a larger amount of bequests.
Yet, analytical results indicate that the negative eﬀect always oﬀsets the
(possibly) positive eﬀect. Furthermore, individual savings decline as interest
rates decrease and also as individuals have less income out of which to save
due to the negative income eﬀect. These results are summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 5 A larger share of total government outlays allocated to gov-
ernment consumption unambiguously decreases growth.
Proof: Recall the growth factor, equation (33). The elasticity of growth with
respect to the parameter φ can then be written as
ˆ gφ =ˆ gR ˆ Rφ +ˆ gI ˆ Iφ
15Analytically, it can be shown that bequests decline if the initial capital income tax
rate is suﬃciently small, i.e., ∂(1 − tw)wt/∂tr >∂ R s t−1/∂tr ⇔ tr < 1− ¯ tr/α. Yet, total
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Consequently, the overall eﬀect is clearly negative.
The intuition behind this result is simple: Private income redistribution is
not capable of oﬀsetting the negative income eﬀects through declining real
wages and lower rates of return to savings. This is due to the fact that every
generation is hit in the same negative way by such a policy reform. In con-
trast to the results found by Rivas (2003), we do not have any restrictions on
the intertemporal substitution elasticity; this means that private income re-
distribution contributes an additional negative eﬀect to the analysis, thereby
ruling out possible positive eﬀects.
2.8 Simulations
Since in general some of the above results have ambiguous eﬀects on growth,
this subsection conducts a numerical calibration exercise using US data in
order to illustrate how the diﬀerent tax policies from the preceding sections
may aﬀect growth.
Before computing these growth eﬀects, the parameters of the model have
to be ﬁxed. Note that one period in the model is assumed to last half a
generation, i.e., 30 years. Following Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996), the capital
income share α is ﬁxed at 0.4. Furthermore, the parameter ˜ A = Y/K is set
to 12, corresponding to a capital–output ratio of 10.59 on a quarterly basis.
A is then chosen to match Y/K =1 2 .
The choices of the capital and labour income tax rates are taken from
Rivas (2003) and set to 35% and 40% respectively. The ﬁrst value is drawn
from IRS data, while the second one is chosen to match the average share
of US total outlays of GDP over the period 1960–1995, amounting to 38%.
The corresponding average share of government consumption expenditures of
GDP is 17.4% for the same time period.16 Accordingly, the spending compo-
sition parameter is set so that φ =0 .6.17 On the side of the households, the
16See OECD Historical Statistics 1995.
17Note that we do not consider expenditures on government transfers. Consequently,
the value for the composition parameter is higher than the one implied by the data, i.e.,
φ =0 .53, for the same time horizon as mentioned above.
24altruism parameter λ is adjusted to generate a steady-state bequest–capital
ratio of 43% for a given value of the intertemporal substitution elasticity
(DeLong, 2003, Fig. 2-1). Further, the individual discount rate δ is cho-
sen to match annual growth and after-tax interest rates of 2% and 4.8%
(for given σ). With respect to the value of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption, there exists no consensus in the econometric
literature. Consequently, most studies, like Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) or
Dalgaard and Jensen (2007), assume log utilities, i.e., σ =1 .18 Since the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is crucial in deter-
mining the reaction of individual savings, alternative scenarios with σ =5 /6
and σ =1 0 /7 are also included in the analysis.19 The parameters of the
model are summarized in table 1.
[Insert table 1 here.]
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results when an increase in capital income
taxation is used either to cut wage taxes or to enhance public services, re-
spectively, while table 4 lists the results of changes in government’s spending
composition in favour of government consumption. In each table the eﬀects
of the respective policy reform on the bequest–capital ratio x, the (annual)
interest factor R, and, for varying σ, the (annual) growth factor g, as well as
its derivative with respect to either the capital income tax (∂g/∂tr)o rt h e
spending composition parameter (∂g/∂φ), are displayed. The ﬁrst column of
each table shows the benchmark case.
[Insert table 2 here.]
First, look at table 2. A 5-percentage-point increase of the capital income
tax allows for a reduction of the wage tax by 3%, while such an increase
leads to a decline of the annual interest rate by approximately 0.2%.A sl o n g
as bequests are operative, i.e., x>0, growth unambiguously decreases. For
example, in the case of σ =1 , a 5-percentage-point increase in the capital
income tax from 35% to 40% reduces the annual growth rate by 0.13%.Y e t ,
if bequests are no longer operative, i.e., x =0 , the growth eﬀects are reversed,
and a further increase in the capital income tax then enhances growth as in
Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996).
[Insert table 3 here.]
18Dalgaard and Jensen (2007) justify this, observing that the empirical savings elasticity
is more or less constant. This implies that substitution and income eﬀects oﬀset each other,
which will only be the case if σ =1 .
19These choices again correspond to the values used by Rivas (2003), who carries out a
similar calibration exercise.
25Second, look at table 3. Raising the capital income tax rate by 5 percent-
age points in this case allows one to increase the share of total government
spending in the GDP by 2%. The annual interest factor declines, and the
decline becomes more pronounced the higher the existing level of capital in-
come taxation.20 By contrast, incremental increases of the capital income
tax by 5% enhance growth whether bequests are inoperative or operative.
Note, however, that if x>0 the growth eﬀects are very small and there
seems to exist a growth-maximizing tax rate, which is, for example, between
40% and 45% for σ =1 .43.
[Insert table 4 here.]
Finally, look at table 4. Raising the share of public spending in govern-
ment consumption in favour of public services unambiguously and severely
decreases annual growth and interest rates as factor productivity declines.
For example, enhancing φ from 60% to 65% reduces the annual interest rate
by 0.51% and the annual growth rate (in the case σ =1 )b y0.54%.Y e t ,a
5-percentage-point increase in φ enhances the bequest–capital ratio by 2%21,
indicating that the negative income eﬀect of the young generation is more
severe than the decline in the old’s return to savings.
What are the policy conclusions to be drawn from this calibration exer-
cise? Of course, the model cannot exactly mirror the situation in the US.
Still, it points to some important insights concerning the relation of capital
income taxation and growth: First, the intergenerational transfers within the
family do aﬀect this relation and may even reverse positive results found by
previous studies. Second, the reallocation of additional revenue from capital
income taxation matters in determining the sign of the growth eﬀect. From a
growth-maximizing point of view, the analysis suggests enhancing productive
government spending (e.g., investment in infrastructure) rather than lower-
ing wage taxes. Third, shifts in the composition of total government outlays
towards unproductive spending may severely aﬀect growth.
3 Conclusions
The focus of this paper is to reexamine the relation between capital income
taxation and growth within a one-sector endogenous growth model in which
20Note, however, that for the chosen parameters values, the critical capital tax rate ¯ tr
amounts to 36%, implying that, in the benchmark case, a slight increase in tr actually
increases the interest factor.
21For the chosen parameter values, bequests would decrease as a reaction to the policy
reform under consideration if tr < 0.1.
26intergenerational transfers take the form of bequests within the family. In
this model, a fraction of government spending aﬀects the productivity of
private production factors while the remaining part of total tax revenue is
allocated to unproductive government consumption. The analysis features
three speciﬁc policy reforms: First, the additional revenue from an increase
of the capital income tax is used to cut wage taxes. Second, the additional
revenue is used to enhance productive government spending. Third, the
government changes the composition of total government outlays in favour
of government consumption.
The analysis extends and generalizes previous studies by Uhlig and Yana-
gawa (1996) and Rivas (2003). The results of those authors are obtained if
bequests are inoperative and the additional revenue from capital income tax-
ation is used either to cut existing wage taxes or to increase the fraction of
public services. In these cases, capital income taxation may increase growth,
if savings are suﬃciently inelastic to changes in the interest rate.
However, if bequests within the family are operative, individuals try to
respond to public income redistribution by adjusting private intergenera-
tional transfers. It is shown that this additional channel of private income
redistribution overturns the positive growth result due to the shift of the
tax burden but cannot completely oﬀset the positive eﬀect stemming from
changes in factor productivity. Moreover, increasing the share of government
consumption of total outlays unambiguously reduces growth.
These results are generally driven by three channels: First, they depend
on how interest rates and savings react to the respective policy reform. Sec-
ond, public income redistribution policy aﬀects individual income and thus
the individual consumption–saving decision. Third, individuals try to oﬀset
public income redistribution by adjusting private transfers. Numerical cali-
bration results using US data underscore the theoretical ﬁndings. Yet, in the
case of operative bequests, adjusting the tax structure as well as increasing
the share of government consumption in total outlays leads to a sharp de-
cline in annual growth rates, while the positive impact of increasing public
services is relatively small in absolute values.
As this paper deals with the positive eﬀect of capital income taxation
on growth, it does not consider welfare eﬀects. Nevertheless, the analysis
suggests at least two things: First, the presence of intergenerational transfers
does inﬂuence the relation between taxation and growth. Consequently, one
has to be cautious with possible policy implications, as these may vary with
the regime in which the economy is operating (operative versus inoperative
bequests). Second, from a growth-maximizing point of view, investing in a
country’s infrastructure seems to be superior to cutting existing wage taxes,
irrespective of the presence of private intergenerational transfers. However, if
27the initial state of the economy is such that bequests are operative, extensive
taxation of income from capital may then deliver the largest gains in growth,
when tax policy crowds out private transfers within the family.
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30Parameter Value Source
α 0.4 Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996)
δ Chosen to generate an annual growth rate of 2%
λ To match x =0 .43 for given σ—DeLong (2003)
˜ A 12 Matches K/Y =1 0 .59—Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996)
A Chosen to satisfy ˜ A
tr 0.35 IRS data—Hendricks (1999)
tw 0.4 Matches κ =0 .38—Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996)
φ 0.6 Matches total outlays of 22% of GDP
Table 1: Utilized parameter values
σ =0 .83 σ =1 σ =1 .43
tr tw x R g∂ g / ∂ t r g∂ g / ∂ t r g∂ g / ∂ t r
0.35 0.4 0.43 1.048 1.020 −1.09 1.02 −1.31 1.02 −1.87
0.4 0.37 0.19 1.046 1.0189 −1.14 1.0187 −1.37 1.0182 −1.94
0.45 0.33 0 1.044 1.0184 1.97 1.0180 1.71 1.0168 1.04
0.5 0.3 0 1.042 1.0203 2.02 1.0196 1.71 1.0178 0.94
0.55 0.27 0 1.039 1.222 2.07 1.0212 1.71 1.0187 0.82
Table 2: Increasing the capital income tax and reducing wage taxes—the
eﬀects on the bequest–capital ratio x, the interest factor R, the growth factor
g, and its derivative ∂g/∂tr.
31σ =0 .83 σ =1 σ =1 .43
tr κ x R g∂ g / ∂ t r g∂ g / ∂ t r g∂ g / ∂ t r
0.35 0.38 0.43 1.0483 1.020 0.60 1.02 0.60 1.02 0.62
0.4 0.4 0.27 1.0482 1.0205 0.38 1.0204 0.36 1.0204 0.30
0.45 0.42 0.09 1.0479 1.0207 0.15 1.0207 0.09 1.0205 −0.06
0.5 0.44 0 1.0472 1.0220 2.72 1.0219 2.61 1.0216 2.34
0.55 0.46 0 1.0462 1.0244 2.84 1.0242 2.67 1.0236 2.24
Table 3: Increasing the capital income tax and the share of public spending
in GDP—the eﬀects on the bequest–capital ratio x, the interest factor R,t h e
growth factor g, and its derivative ∂g/∂tr.
σ =0 .83 σ =1 σ =1 .43
φ x R g∂ g / ∂ φ g∂ g / ∂ φg∂ g / ∂ φ
0.6 0.43 1.0483 1.020 −4.94 1.02 −5.47 1.02 −6.83
0.65 0.45 1.0432 1.015 −4.72 1.0146 −5.12 1.0133 −6.14
0.7 0.48 1.0376 1.010 −4.48 1.0088 −4.76 1.0060 −5.45
0.75 0.5 1.0316 1.004 −4.21 1.0023 −4.37 0.9980 −4.74
0.8 0.52 1.0251 0.997 −3.91 0.9951 −3.94 0.9893 −4.02
Table 4: Increasing the share of spending in government consumption—the
eﬀects on the bequest–capital ratio x, the interest factor R,the growth factor
g, and its derivative ∂g/∂φ.
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